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And, the Winner Is. . .A Visual Preference for
Endpoints over Starting Points in Infants’
Motion Event Representations
Laura Lakusta and Stephanie DiFabrizio
Montclair State University

Infants represent objects that are endpoints in motion events and show a preference for
encoding the endpoint (the duck waddles into a bowl) over the starting point (the duck
waddles out of a box). This asymmetry continues to appear in nonlinguistic cognition and
language throughout development. This study tests whether this asymmetry also shows up
in 16-month-old infants’ visual preferences for motion events, and if so, for which types of
events. Infants looked longer at events depicting an “agentive” ﬁgure (e.g., duck) moving
into an object (endpoint) than out of an object (starting point), and this asymmetry persisted even when the starting point object was larger and more colorful than the endpoint
object and when it caused the motion of the ﬁgure. However, an asymmetry was not
found when motion into/out of the endpoint/starting point involved was performed by a
“nonagentive” (e.g., leaf) ﬁgure. These ﬁndings suggest that an endpoint/starting point
asymmetry in infant cognition (1) extends to infants’ visual preferences of motion events,
(2) shows up most strongly for events that involve an “agentive” ﬁgure, and (3) is largely
unaﬀected by the physical saliency of the starting point object. How a visual endpoint
preference may support the acquisition of spatial language is considered.

The endpoint of an event plays a critical role in structuring event representations for
both adults and children. In event perception, endpoints that are goals (i.e., the endpoint of an intentional action) play a role in structuring an event’s parts and subparts.
For example, the broad goal of climbing to the top in life can be hierarchically decomposed into its subparts of “getting an education,” “working to pass the third grade,”
“walking to school,” “crossing the street,” etc. (Barker & Wright, 1954; as cited in
Zacks & Tversky, 2001), and indeed event segmentation research has shown that
adults are sensitive to this hierarchical, partonomic structure of events (Zacks,
Tversky, & Iyer, 2001).
Infants 10–11 months of age are also sensitive to boundaries marked by endpoints
in intentional events, such as a person picking a towel up oﬀ the ﬂoor (Baldwin, Baird,
Saylor, & Clark, 2001), and 12-month-olds are sensitive to endpoints of highly
Correspondence should be sent to Laura Lakusta, Department of Psychology, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ 07043. E-mail: lakustal@mail.montclair.edu
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complex actions, such as a triple lutz double toe loop in ﬁgure skating (Levine, HirshPasek, & Golinkoﬀ, 2013). Further, it is now well established that infants, prior to
12 months, encode the endpoint object of goal-directed actions (e.g., Csibra, 2008;
Johnson, Ok, & Luo, 2007; Lakusta, Wagner, O’Hearn, & Landau, 2007; Lakusta &
Carey, 2015; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Meltzoﬀ, 1995; Olofson & Baldwin, 2011;
Schlottmann & Ray, 2010; Sodian, Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004; Wagner & Carey, 2005;
Woodward, 1998, 1999; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000) and make proactive, anticipatory eye movements to endpoint objects when observing various types of reaches
and grasps performed by an agent (e.g., Ambrosini et al., 2013; Falck-Ytter, Gredeb€
ack, & von Hofsten, 2006; Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, Wilkinson, & Gredeb€ack,
2014). Thus, before their ﬁrst birthday, endpoints that may be represented as “goals”
play an integral role in structuring infants’ event representations. The aim of the current study was to further our understanding about the prominence of endpoints in
infants’ motion event representations.
The classic paradigm that has been used to show infants’ encoding of endpoint
objects in events involves habituating (or familiarizing) infants to one event and then
showing them two diﬀerent events that diﬀer from the habituation event along one
dimension. For example, in the classic Woodward (1998) study, infants were habituated to a hand reaching for one of two endpoint objects and then viewed the hand
reach for a diﬀerent object (but along the same path that it had reached previously)
versus the same object (but along a diﬀerent path). Longer looking at one change relative to the other change (diﬀerent object versus diﬀerent path) was taken as evidence
that infants encoded the component and considered it a relevant component of the
event. Infants as young as 5–6 months looked longer when the hand reached for a different endpoint object; however, they did not show this pattern when the reaching was
performed by a mechanical claw. This suggests that the type of ﬁgure performing the
action (hand versus claw) modulates infants’ encoding of the endpoint object over the
path of motion. Since Woodward’s seminal study, studies have shown that a range of
behavioral and morphological cues of the ﬁgure in the event inﬂuence whether infants
represent the endpoint as a relevant component of the event; these cues include the
type of motion (biological or not; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010), self-propelled movement
(Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), rational action (Csibra, 2008), causation at a distance
(Schlottmann, Surian, & Ray, 2009), communicative interaction (Shimizu & Johnson,
2004) and having a face (Bonatti, Frot, Zangl, & Mehler, 2002). It is worth noting that
theories diﬀer in their interpretations about how infants are representing the endpoint
in events, especially for children younger than 18–24 months. For example, some theories posit that infants use certain cues to identify the ﬁgure as an animate agent and
represent the action as intentional and goal-directed (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2007), while
others argue that infants associate certain properties of the ﬁgure (e.g., human arm)
with particular actions (reach), which in turn results in the endpoint being encoded in
some events and not others (e.g., see Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001 for a review).
Recently, studies (Lakusta & Carey, 2015; Lakusta et al., 2007) have adapted the
Woodward paradigm described above to test how infants represent endpoint objects in
motion events compared to another event component—the starting point. In motion
events (duck walks from a bowl to a box), starting points (from a bowl) are similar to
endpoints (to a box) in terms of the spatial structure of the event (both are reference
objects of paths of motion; Jackendoﬀ, 1990), although in language they have been
shown to have a signiﬁcantly less prominent role than endpoints (e.g., Lakusta &
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Landau, 2005; see General Discussion). In these studies, 12-month-old infants were
familiarized to a ﬁgure moving from one of two starting point objects to one of two
endpoint objects. During test, infants viewed the ﬁgure move away from a diﬀerent
starting point (but to the same endpoint) versus to a diﬀerent endpoint (but away from
the same starting point). When the ﬁgure was a self-propelled duck or a self-propelled
balloon with a face, infants looked longer when the ﬁgure moved to a diﬀerent endpoint object. This suggests that infants attended to and remembered the endpoint
object more robustly than the starting point object during familiarization and hence
were more surprised when it changed during test compared to when the starting point
object changed. However, when the ﬁgure was a non-self-propelled balloon with a
non-face-like pattern, infants did not show an endpoint bias, rather they looked about
equally at the endpoint versus starting point change events. Lakusta et al. (2007) and
Lakusta and Carey (2015) concluded that the asymmetry between endpoints and starting points is strongest for agentive events.
The current study
The aim of this study was to provide a conceptual replication of the “agentive’/“nonagentive” pattern of results described above with a very diﬀerent methodology—one
that measures infants’ visual preferences for events while tightly controlling for the
amount of time that the ﬁgure is located at the starting point and endpoint objects.
Additionally, this study aimed to further explore the nature of the asymmetry between
endpoints and starting points in infant cognition by modulating other properties of
motion events. The Lakusta et al. studies described above (2007, 2015) used a change
detection method in which the starting point and endpoint objects both participated in
the event. And, at the end of the event, the ﬁgure remained at the endpoint until a
pre-established criterion was reached. Thus, one possibility is that infants may have
paid more attention to the endpoint object over the starting point object because the
ﬁgure was located at the endpoint at the end of the event. In fact, this is exactly the
type of explanation that has been oﬀered for an endpoint bias in some models of spatial term learning (Regier, 1996). This explanation seems unlikely given that Lakusta
and Carey (2015) did not observe an endpoint bias for “nonagentive” events, but the
strongest evidence against this explanation would be to present infants with events in
which the ﬁgure is located at the starting point and endpoint for the same exact
amount of time. This study does just this by employing a visual preference paradigm
in which infants view events with only a starting point object (duck moves out of the
box) and with only an endpoint object (duck moves into a box) and, importantly,
the events loop, such that the ﬁgure is located at the endpoint and starting point for
the same amount of time. Utilizing this paradigm also provides the opportunity to
explore at what level of information processing such an endpoint bias may exist in
infants; rather than testing infants’ memory representations of an event that they
viewed during a prior familiarization/habituation period, this study’s visual preference
paradigm will simply measure which types of events infants prefer to look at—events
with endpoint objects or events with starting point objects. Visual preferences have
been reported in domains such as face perception (e.g., Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, &
Morton, 1991; Langlois et al., 1987) and motion perception (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf,
2008) and have been shown to play a signiﬁcant role in infants’ subsequent learning
about the environment. Our aim is to establish whether there is a visual preference for
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motion events depicting a ﬁgure moving into an endpoint object versus out of a starting point object and, if there is, to raise hypotheses about how this preference could
support subsequent language learning.
This study tests 16-month-old infants. As will be discussed at length in the General
Discussion, previous ﬁndings (Lakusta & Carey, 2015; Papafragou, 2010; Regier &
Zheng, 2007) suggest that an endpoint/starting point asymmetry in nonlinguistic/preverbal cognition may play a signiﬁcant role in bootstrapping children’s acquisition of
spatial language, such as acquiring the semantic and syntactic structure of motion
verbs and prepositional phrases that encode starting points (“Jessica ran from the
store”) and endpoints (“Nicholas ran to the pond”). If this is the case, then any visual
preference for endpoints versus starting points should show up during the time in
development when children are in the midst of acquiring such spatial language.
Research in language acquisition suggests that the period between 12 and 24 months is
an active time for the development of spatial language cross-linguistically, with children around 14 months starting to produce language encoding starting points and endpoints in motion events (prepositions in English, such as “on,” “into,” “out of,” and
“oﬀ,” Choi & Bowerman, 1991) and children by 18 months starting to broaden their
understanding of prepositions such as “on” (Meints, Plunkett, Harris, & Dimmock,
2002). Thus, if a visual preference for endpoint events inﬂuences spatial language
acquisition, then such a preference should exist at 16 months.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Twenty-six 16-month-old infants participated; 13 infants in each of the “agentive”
and “nonagentive” conditions (“agentive” condition: nine females; mean
age = 15 months, 27 days; range: 15 months, 16 days to 16 months, 14 days; “nonagentive” condition: six females; mean age = 15 months, 22 days; range: 15 months,
15 days to 16 months, 16 days). One additional infant was excluded in the “agentive”
condition because of fussiness that prevented the experiment from ﬁnishing and three
additional infants were excluded in the “nonagentive” condition, two because of fussiness and the third because of a technical error.1 Fussiness was either excessive crying
by the infant or an unwillingness to sit on the caregiver’s lap.
Stimuli
Infants were shown motion events that were created in Adobe Flash. The motion
events depicted a ﬁgure (object undergoing the motion) moving out of an object
(henceforth the “starting point”) or into an object (henceforth the “endpoint”). The
ﬁgures for the “agentive” condition were a duck and a plane and the ﬁgures for the
1
For ease of exposition, we refer to the two conditions in Exp. 1 as “agentive” and “nonagentive.” However, we acknowledge that it is an open question whether infants actually represent the moving ﬁgure as an
intentional, goal-directed agent (see Introduction and General Discussion). We use quotes when referring to
the experimental conditions to remind readers of this point.
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‘Non-Agentive’ Condition
Test Trial Pair A

End point event

Starting point event

End point event

Starting point event

Test Trial Pair B

End point event

Starting point event

End point event

Starting point event

Test Trial Pair C

End point event

Starting point event

End point event

Starting point event

Figure 1 Test events used in Experiment 1, for both the “agentive’ and “nonagentive” conditions,
respectively. Pair A: A duck walks into a box (endpoint event) and a duck walks out of a box
(starting point event)/A leaf ﬂoats into a box (endpoint event) and a leaf ﬂoats out of a box (starting
point event). Pair B: A duck walks into a bowl (endpoint event) and a duck walks out of a bowl
(starting point event)/A leaf ﬂoats into a bowl (endpoint event) and a leaf ﬂoats out of a bowl
(starting point event). Pair C: A plane ﬂies into a bowl (endpoint event) and a plane ﬂies out of a
bowl (starting point event)/A tissue ﬂoats into a bowl (endpoint event) and a tissue ﬂoats out of a
bowl (starting point event). Note that the events were displayed sequentially (rather than
simultaneously; see Method).

“nonagentive” condition were a leaf and a tissue. A plane was included as a ﬁgure for
the “agentive” condition as an exploratory trial to test whether infants would show a
similar pattern of looking as they would show for the duck events (a duck is arguably
more likely to be represented as an agent than a plane given that it is an animal and
has a face). The starting point and endpoint reference objects were a box and a bowl
(see Figure 1). All the events began with an animated curtain opening (.5 sec). Then,
for the events including endpoints, the ﬁgure emerged from behind the animated curtain and moved (.75 sec) into an endpoint object (and remained there for .75 sec). The
animated curtain then closed (.5 sec) and remained closed (.25 sec). The event would
then begin playing again; thus, the events looped. The events including starting points
were exactly the same as the endpoint events except the ﬁgure moved out of an object
that was its starting point and ended up behind the animated curtain. Whether the
endpoint (starting point) objects were located on the right or left side of the stage was
counterbalanced across infants.
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In addition to the “agentive” and “nonagentive” conditions diﬀering in the type of
ﬁgure that moved (duck/plane for the “agentive” condition and tissue/leaf for the
“nonagentive” condition), the “agentive” and “nonagentive” events also diﬀered in the
following ways: (1) given that self-propelled motion is one cue that infants may use to
infer goal-directed motion (e.g., Luo, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009), the leaf/tissue
events were constructed such that self-propelled motion was not an obvious property
of the leaf/tissue; this was accomplished by having an animated curtain partially cover
the objects during the test events to make it ambiguous as to how the ﬁgure initiated
its movement, and (2) the duck/plane in the “agentive” condition moved in a straight
path to the endpoint/away from the starting point (the duck “walked”, the plane
“ﬂew”), whereas the leaf/tissue in the “nonagentive” condition moved in a circuitous
fashion, as to appear as if it was being blown around by wind (see Figure 1). Other
than these diﬀerences, the events were exactly the same.
Design and procedure
The stimuli were presented on a projection screen. A curtain was attached to the
ceiling in front of and above the screen and was raised at the beginning of each trial
and was lowered at the end of each trial. The infant sat on their caregiver’s lap about
two feet in front of the screen. The parent was asked to close his or her eyes for the
duration of the experiment. The infant’s looking time at the screen was recorded by a
trained observer. The observer watched the infant on a computer monitor and pressed
a key on a computer keyboard whenever the infant looked at the screen. Looking time
was not recorded until the infant looked at the event for at least 2.5 continuous seconds; this ensured that the infant viewed the beginning of the event. A computer program (Xhab) calculated the infant’s looking time (Pinto, 1994). When the infant
looked away from the screen for two continuous seconds, or until 60 sec had elapsed,
the computer program beeped to signal to the experimenter to proceed to the next
trial.
The experiment began with the coder calibrating the infants’ looking space by jiggling keys to direct infants’ attention to the top, bottom, center and sides of the screen.
After calibration, there was a familiarization phase. The purpose of this phase was to
acquaint the infants with the ﬁgures and reference objects that they would view during
the test phase. During this familiarization phase, infants viewed eight events: four
events depicted the ﬁgure (2 duck events and two plane events for the “agentive” condition; two leaf events and two tissue events for the “nonagentive” condition) moving
back and forth (4 sec) and four events depicted the stationary reference objects (box/
bowl) located next to each other (4 sec). For two of the events, the box was located to
the left of the bowl, and for the other two events, the bowl was located to the left of
the box. The eight familiarization events were always presented such that the ﬁgure
events preceded the reference object events (e.g., duck, plane, duck, plane, box/bowl,
bowl/box, box/bowl, and bowl/box). Whether the duck/plane (leaf/tissue) was presented ﬁrst was counterbalanced across infants, and the two types of ﬁgures were
always presented in an alternating fashion (e.g., duck, plane, duck, plane). The familiarization events were presented sequentially and looped until the pre-established looking criterion was reached.
After familiarization, infants were presented with six test events that were presented
as a set of three pairs, each pair consisting of an endpoint event and a starting point
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event: duck (leaf) moves into/out of box (pair A), duck (leaf) moves into/out of bowl
(pair B), and plane (tissue) moves into/out of bowl (pair C)2 (see Figure 1). The order
in which the pairs were presented was counterbalanced across infants. Further,
whether the endpoint or starting point motion event was presented ﬁrst or second in
the pair was counterbalanced across infants (but held constant within each participant;
for example, if the endpoint event was presented ﬁrst, it was presented ﬁrst for each
pair for that participant). The test events were presented sequentially and looped until
the pre-established looking criterion was reached (see above).
Reliability
To assess coding reliability, 100 percent of the infants were coded by a second
trained observer. Average percent agreement between coder one and coder two was
calculated by Xhab. Average interobserver agreement was 94.7% for the “agentive”
condition, 94.9% for the “nonagentive” condition, and 95.2% and 96.0% percent for
experiments 2 and 3, respectively.
Results
Infants’ looking times at the familiarization events to each ﬁgure declined from the
ﬁrst to the second presentation (“agentive”: Ms (SEs) for duck events = 32.79 (5.04),
20.65 (4.73); Ms (SEs) for plane events = 26.31 (5.23), 16.71 (4.73)); “nonagentive”:
Ms (SEs) for leaf events = 25.63 (4.73), 13.53 (2.0); Ms (SEs) for tissue events = 21.53
(5.78), 17.75 (5.13)). On average, infants in the “agentive” condition looked longer at
the duck events (M = 26.72, SE = 3.75) than the infants in the “nonagentive” condition looked at the leaf events (M = 19.58, SE = 2.21), although the diﬀerence was not
signiﬁcant, t(24) = 1.64, p = .11 (d = .66). The diﬀerence between looking at the plane
events (M = 21.51, SE = 3.92) for infants in the “agentive” condition compared to the
tissue events (M = 19.64, SE = 4.44) for infants in the “nonagentive” condition was
much less and also not signiﬁcant, t(24) = .32, p = .76 (d = .12).
For both the “agentive” and “nonagentive” conditions, infants’ looking times
declined over familiarization (henceforth, “Fam”) to the reference objects (Ms and SEs
for “agentive” Fam 1 versus 4 = 18.06 (3.84) versus 6.31 (1.14) and “nonagentive”
Fam 1 versus 4 = 22.18 (3.84) versus 8.24 (1.14)); a mixed 2 (Fam trial: Fam 1, Fam
4) 9 2 (Cond: “agentive,” “nonagentive”) ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of Fam trial, F(1, 24) = 22.86, p < .001 (ƞ2 = .49). There was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of condition, F(1, 24) = 1.04, p = .318 (ƞ2 = .04), nor was there a signiﬁcant interaction
between Fam trial and condition F(1, 24) = .165, p = .688 (ƞ2 = .007).
A 2 9 3 9 2 mixed ANOVA examined the eﬀects of trial type (endpoint, starting
point), test trial pair (A, B, C), and condition (“agentive,” “nonagentive”) on looking
times during the test trials. This yielded a signiﬁcant eﬀect of test trial type,
F(1, 24) = 8.34, p = .01 (ƞ2 = .26); however, this main eﬀect was subsumed by a signiﬁcant interaction between trial type and condition, F(1, 24) = 4.59, p = .04 (ƞ2 = .16); as
A plane/tissue + box pair was not included because previous experiments revealed that four test trial
pairs resulted in too long a test phase. The purpose of including three diﬀerent trial pairs (rather than simply
repeating the same two) was to explore the generalizability of any visual preferences that may be observed
across diﬀerent objects. If a visual preference is robust, it should extend to diﬀerent objects of the same
type—a ﬁnding that was observed (see Result sections).
2
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Figure 2 Infants’ average looking times (and SEs) at the endpoint and starting point test trials for
Experiment 1 “agentive”/“nonagentive,” Exp. 2, and Exp. 3.

shown in Figure 2, the diﬀerence between looking at the endpoint versus starting point
trials was greater for infants in the “agentive” condition versus the “nonagentive” condition. There were no other signiﬁcant main eﬀects or interactions, ps > .10.
Additional analyses examining each condition separately conﬁrmed this pattern;
two separate 2 9 3 ANOVAs examined the eﬀects of trial type (endpoint, starting
point) and test trial pair (A, B, C) on looking times during the test trials. For the
“agentive” condition, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial type, F(1, 12) = 15.85,
p < .05 (ƞ2 = .57); infants looked longer at endpoint events than starting point events
and 11 of 13 infants showed this pattern, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, z = 2.83,
p < .05, two-tailed. There were no other signiﬁcant eﬀects ps > .10. Although there
was no interaction between trial pair and trial type for the “agentive” condition, the
pattern of the means (Figure 3) suggests that test trials with the plane elicited less of a
looking preference for endpoints than for starting points than the trials with the duck.
Given that the plane may arguably be perceived as less “agentive” than the duck, this
pattern is not surprising and is consistent with the results of the “nonagentive” condition presented below. If the plane trial pair is removed from all the analyses, the
results remain exactly the same.
For the “nonagentive” condition, the eﬀect of trial type (endpoint versus starting
point) was not signiﬁcant F(1, 12) = .23, p = .64, nor was the eﬀect of trial pair or the
interaction between these two variables, ps > .10 (see Figure 4).
Additional analyses tested whether any of the counterbalanced variables (endpoint
trial presented ﬁrst or second, reference objects positioned right or left in the event,
and male or female) aﬀected looking times during the test trials. These analyses did
not produce any signiﬁcant results for the “agentive” condition in Exp. 1 or for experiments 2 and 3. However, for the “nonagentive” condition in Exp. 1, a signiﬁcant interaction was found between trial type and whether the endpoint test trial was presented
ﬁrst or second. F(1, 11) = 8.79, p < .05, g2p = .44. Further examination of the means
revealed that infants who viewed the endpoint events ﬁrst in the presentation of the
test trial pairs looked longer at the starting point events (M = 23.20, SE = 5.03) versus
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Figure 3 Infants’ mean looking times (and SEs) at the three endpoint and starting point test trial
pairs in Experiment 1, “agentive” condition. Note: The average diﬀerence scores (and SEs) for trial
pairs, A, B, and C, respectively, are 11.74 (5.07), 17.9 (4.86), and 1.24 (5.66).

Figure 4 Infants’ mean looking times (and SEs) at the three endpoint and starting point test trial
pairs in Experiment 1, “non-agentive” condition. Note: The average diﬀerence scores (and SEs) for
trial pairs, A, B, and C, respectively, are 5.05 (6.22), 2.12 (7.74), and 1.65 (2.63).

the endpoint events (M = 17.94, SE = 3.11), whereas infants who viewed the starting
point events ﬁrst looked longer at the endpoint events (M = 25.67, SE = 3.36) than
the starting point events (M = 16.23, SE = 5.43). Thus, infants looked longer at the
event that was presented on their second test trial, suggesting that they noticed some
diﬀerence between the two events—possibly a diﬀerence related to the trajectory of the
ﬁgure’s motion.
Extending the results of previous research (Lakusta & Carey, 2015; Lakusta et al.,
2007), the current ﬁndings revealed that infants looked longer at events depicting a ﬁgure moving into an endpoint object versus events depicting a ﬁgure moving out of a
starting point object and, further, that this visual preference showed up most strongly
for events with an animated duck that moved along a straight path into/out of an endpoint/starting point. The presence of this visual preference in infants 16 months of age
may have important implications for language learning—a possibility that we consider
further in the General Discussion.
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If an endpoint bias has implications for subsequent learning, it will be necessary to
understand under what conditions this asymmetry may be modulated. The ﬁndings
above (see also Lakusta & Carey, 2015) suggest that event properties associated with
agents (e.g., face, self-propelled movement toward an object) inﬂuence the asymmetry;
Experiments 2 and 3 test whether increasing the physical saliency of the starting point
object may also modulate the observed visual preference. In Experiment 2, the starting
point objects are made more salient by increasing their size relative to the endpoint
objects and making them more colorful. In Experiment 3, the starting point objects
are made more physically salient by making them move; speciﬁcally, they cause the
motion of the ﬁgure (the “cannon” propels the duck).
EXPERIMENT 2: LARGER, MORE COLORFUL STARTING POINT OBJECTS
Method
Participants
Participants were 13 16-month-old infants (seven female; mean age = 16 months,
7 days; range: 15 months, 21 days to 16 months, 18 days). One additional infant was
excluded because of fussiness.
Stimuli, design, and procedure
The stimuli, design, and procedures were exactly the same as those used in Experiment 1 with the following two exceptions. When the reference objects were starting
points in events, they were made more physically salient; the box and bowl objects
were made larger and more colorful (see reference objects in Figure 5). In addition,
as there were now four diﬀerent reference objects that would be used in the test
events (salient bowl, ordinary bowl, salient box, ordinary box), the four familiarization events depicting the reference objects included the four objects (e.g., ordinary
box, salient box, ordinary bowl, salient bowl) stationary on the stage located next to
each other.
Results
Infants’ looking times at the familiarization events to each ﬁgure declined from the
ﬁrst to the second presentation (Ms (SEs) for duck events = 40.28 (5.83), 22.67 (4.89);
Ms (SEs) for plane events = 37.76 (5.57), 17.90 (4.01)). Infants’ looking times declined
over familiarization to the reference objects; the diﬀerence between looking time at the
ﬁrst (M = 22.79, SE = 5.31) versus last (M = 11.55, SE = 3.25) familiarization trial
was signiﬁcant, paired t(12) = 2.17, p = .05, two-tailed (d = .64).
A 2 9 3 ANOVA examined the eﬀects of trial type (endpoint, starting point) and
test trial pair (A, B, C) on looking times during the test trials (see Figure 6). There
was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial type, F(1, 12) = 20.28, p < .05 (g2p = .628). There
was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial pair, F(2, 24) = .22, p > .10 (g2p = .018), nor was
there a signiﬁcant interaction between these two variables F(2, 24) = .49, p > .10
(g2p = .04). Twelve of 13 infants looked longer at endpoint events than starting point
events, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, z = 3.11, p < .05, two-tailed.
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Test Trial Pair A.

Test Trial Pair B.

Test Trial Pair C.

Figure 5 Test events used in Experiment 2. Pair A: A duck walks into a box (endpoint event) and a
duck walks out of a salient box (starting point event). Pair B: A duck walks into a bowl (endpoint
event) and a duck walks out of a salient bowl (starting point event). Pair C: A plane ﬂies into a bowl
(endpoint event) and a plane ﬂies out of a salient bowl (starting point event).

The results suggest that even when the starting point object is larger and more colorful than the endpoint object, infants continue to look longer at the events depicting
a ﬁgure moving into an endpoint versus out of a starting point. To conﬁrm that the
endpoint bias observed in this experiment was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the endpoint bias observed in the “agentive” condition of Experiment 1, a 2 9 2 mixed
ANOVA examined the eﬀects of trial type (endpoint, starting point) and experiment
(Exp. 1 “agent,” Exp. 2) on looking times during the test trials (see Figure 2). This
yielded a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial type, F(1, 24) = 36.13, p < .05 (g2p = .60); the
main eﬀect of experiment was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 24) = .95, p > .10 (g2p = .04), nor
was the interaction between trial type and experiment, F(1, 24) = .66, p > .10

334

LAKUSTA

& DIFABRIZIO

Figure 6 Infants’ mean looking times (and SEs) at the three endpoint and starting point test trial
pairs in Experiment 2. Note: The average diﬀerence scores (and SEs) for trial pairs, A, B, and C,
respectively are 14.69 (6.47), 16.25 (4.08), and 9.59 (4.25).

(g2p = .03). Thus, unlike the ﬁndings reported in Experiment 1 where the visual preference for endpoints was modulated by changing the properties of the moving ﬁgure and
motion, increasing the physical saliency of the starting point object did not have a similar eﬀect.
In the last experiment, we further explore the eﬀects of making the starting point
more physically salient on a visual preference for endpoint events. We do this by
making the starting point cause the motion of the ﬁgure (a cannon propels the duck
out of the starting point versus the duck moves into the endpoint). Making the
starting point causal increases the physical salience of the starting point because
rather than being a stationary reference object, it now has a part (spring) that
moves to propel the ﬁgure (see Figure 7), and research reports that a moving object
captures infants’ attention (Slater, 1989). It is also possible that having the starting
point cause the motion of the ﬁgure may lead infants to construe the starting point
as causal and/or agentive (e.g., Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Golinkoﬀ & Kerr, 1978; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Muentener & Carey, 2010; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005),
which in turn may result in infants attending more to it since the initial movement
of the ﬁgure is now dependent on the starting point. Indeed, Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, and Gredeb€
ack (2012) report that modulating properties of an endpoint object
that are relevant for goal-directed reaching actions (size of the endpoint object)
inﬂuences infants’ action prediction; making the starting point causal, the ﬁgure’s
motion may have similar eﬀects. A third possibility is that with a causal starting
point the ﬁgure may be perceived as less agentive. All these possibilities lead to the
prediction that the asymmetry between endpoint and starting point events may lessen for events with causal starting points. However, recent ﬁndings by Lakusta et al.
(2016) suggest that an endpoint bias persists when young children and adults
describe events with causal starting points, and preliminary data reported by Reardon, Lakusta, Muentener, and Carey (2009) suggest that 12-month-old infants continue to encode the endpoint more than the starting point even when the starting
point is causal, leading to the prediction that infants may continue to show a visual
preference for endpoint events despite the starting point being more physically salient and causal.
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Test Trial Pair A.

Test Trial Pair B.

Test Trial Pair C.

Figure 7 Test events used in Experiment 3. Pair A: A duck walks into a box (endpoint event) and a
duck is sprung out of a box (starting point event). Pair B: A duck walks into a bowl (endpoint event)
and a duck is sprung out of a bowl (starting point event). Pair C: A plane ﬂies into a bowl (endpoint
event) and a plane is sprung out of a bowl (starting point event).

EXPERIMENT 3: MOVING, CAUSAL STARTING POINTS
Method
Participants
Participants were 13 16-month-old infants (seven female, Mean age = 16 months,
2 days; range: 15 months, 18 days to 16 months, 14 days). One additional infant was
excluded because of experimenter error.
Stimuli, design, and procedure
The stimuli, design and procedures were exactly the same as those used in Experiment 1 with the following exception. When the reference objects were starting point
objects in the events, they were made more salient; the box and bowl objects were
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made to include a mechanism that moved to cause the motion of the ﬁgure (see
Figure 7). To conﬁrm that the starting point events were successful in portraying that
the starting point caused the motion of the ﬁgure, 14 adults were asked to describe the
events and their language was coded as causal or not (either using a verb that encoded
the cause and eﬀect and/or encoding the mechanism of causation, such as the spring).
Adults described these events with causal language (e.g., “duck sprung out of bowl”)
over 75% of the time, whereas they never encoded the corresponding endpoint events
with causal language. This suggests the starting point events portrayed causation (at
least for adults). In addition, similar to Experiment 2, as there were now four diﬀerent
reference objects that would be used in the test events (causal bowl, ordinary bowl,
causal box, ordinary box), the four familiarization events depicting the reference
objects included the four objects.
Results

Average Looking Time
(sec.)

Infants’ looking times at the familiarization events to each ﬁgure declined from the
ﬁrst to the second presentation (Ms (SEs) for duck events = 39.44 (5.92) and 24.11
(4.51); Ms (SEs) for plane events = 33.68 (5.09) and 29.58 (6.76)). Infants’ looking
times declined over familiarization to the reference objects; the diﬀerence between
looking time at the ﬁrst (M = 29.17, SE = 5.15) versus last (M = 11.14, SE = 1.68)
familiarization trial was signiﬁcant, paired t(12) = 3.60, p = .004, two-tailed (d = 1.19).
A 2 9 3 ANOVA examined the eﬀects of trial type (endpoint, starting point) and
test trial pair (A, B, C) on looking times during the test trials (see Figure 8). There
was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial type, F(1, 12) = 27.03, p < .05 (g2p = .69). There
was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial pair, F(2, 24) = .35, p > .10 (g2p = .03), nor was
there a signiﬁcant interaction between these two variables F(2, 24) = .19, p > .10
(g2p = .015). Twelve of 13 infants looked longer at endpoint events than starting point
events, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, z = 3.06, p < .05, two-tailed.
The results suggest that even when the starting point has a mechanism that moves,
infants continue to look longer at events where a ﬁgure moves into a stationary “nonmoving” endpoint versus events where a ﬁgure moves out of a moving starting point

Figure 8 Infants’ mean looking times (and SEs) at the three endpoint and starting point test trial
pairs in Experiment 3. Note: The average diﬀerence scores (and SEs) for trial pairs, A, B, and C,
respectively, are 17.72 (4.69), 12.88 (5.65), and 13.46 (6.69).
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that causes the motion of the ﬁgure. To conﬁrm that the endpoint bias was not signiﬁcantly modulated by the increased saliency/causality of the starting point, a 2 9 2
mixed ANOVA examined the eﬀects of trial type (endpoint, starting point) and experiment (Exp. 1 “agentive” condition, Exp. 3) on looking times during the test trials (see
Figure 2). This yielded a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial type, F(1, 24) = 42.56, p < .05
(g2p = .64); the interaction between experiment and test trial type was not signiﬁcant
F(1, 24) = 1.32, p > .10 (g2p = .05), nor was the main eﬀect of experiment,
F(1, 24) = 2.84, p > .10.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
When 16-month-old infants viewed events depicting a ﬁgure moving into an endpoint
object versus events depicting a ﬁgure moving out of a starting point object, infants
looked longer at the endpoint object events. This asymmetry in looking time was
observed for events where both the starting point and endpoint were stationary, solid
colored reference objects (Exp. 1, “agentive” condition; e.g., the duck moved into/out
of a box), as well as for events where the starting point objects were larger in size and
more colorful than the endpoint objects (Exp. 2), and when the starting point objects
involved movement and caused the motion of the ﬁgure (Exp. 3). In contrast, infants
did not look signiﬁcantly longer at the endpoint events when the events depicted a
“nonagentive” ﬁgure move into versus out of an object (Exp. 1, “nonagentive” condition; e.g., the leaf ﬂew into/out of a box). This pattern of results has implications for
understanding the nature of the asymmetry between starting points and endpoints in
infants’ motion event representations and for understanding how a visual preference
for endpoints may support subsequent learning. The ﬁndings also raise several questions for future research.
The nature of an endpoint/starting point asymmetry in infant cognition
The methodology used in the current study, speciﬁcally the looped video presentation
of the starting point and endpoint events, rules out any possibility that previous
reports of an endpoint/starting point asymmetry can be explained by the ﬁgure being
located at the endpoint in the motion event for a longer amount of time than the starting point (Lakusta & Carey, 2015; Lakusta et al., 2007). By having the events loop,
the length of time that the ﬁgure remained stationary at the starting point and endpoint was exactly the same. Further, unlike previous studies, infants were not tested
on how long they looked at events that had either a diﬀerent endpoint (e.g., into a
bowl versus onto a block) versus a diﬀerent starting point (out of a bowl versus oﬀ a
block) compared to prior familiarization. Rather, duration of infants’ gaze was measured for events that either had an endpoint (e.g., into a box) or a starting point (e.g.,
out of a box), and the results revealed a visual preference for endpoint events. One
question raised for future research is whether such a visual preference extends to other
spatial paths, such as paths involving support (moving on/oﬀ of an object) and
toward/away (moving to/from an object). The language ﬁndings described in the latter
part of this discussion suggest that an endpoint bias is quite general in language,
extending to events with a variety of spatial paths; if an endpoint bias in infant
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representations reﬂects the bias found in language, then infants’ visual preference for
endpoint over starting point events should extend to a variety of spatial relations as
well.
The visual preference for endpoints over starting points observed in the current
study was inﬂuenced by the kind of ﬁgure (e.g., duck versus leaf) and/or the type of
motion taken by the ﬁgure (self-propelled with a direct path versus ambiguous motion
initiation with a circuitous path), but not by the physical saliency of the starting point
objects (Exp. 2: bigger and more colorful; Exp. 3: moving starting point). This suggests
that infants’ preference for endpoint over starting point events may be inﬂuenced by
event properties related to agency, and maybe causality,3 and does not apply generally
to all endpoints and starting points in spatial events (such as proposed by Regier &
Zheng, 2007). Note that this pattern of results is consistent with Lakusta and Carey
(2015) who employed a very diﬀerent methodology (see Introduction), including diﬀerent “agentive” and “nonagentive” events. Recall that in that study the “nonagentive”
events included a balloon (without a face) “ﬂoating” along a straight path from a
starting point to an endpoint. The similar pattern of results across the two studies
despite the diﬀerences in methodologies suggests that the looking time diﬀerences
found for the “agentive” versus “nonagentive” events is likely to be a result of how
the events diﬀer in the cues that they portray related to agency and/or causality, rather
than as a result of superﬁcial diﬀerences between the events. Below, we consider two
possible explanations of why infants in the current study may have shown a visual
preference for endpoint events over starting point events, thus shedding light on how a
visual preference for endpoints over starting points may develop more generally.
One explanation, based on theories referred to as “cue-based bootstrapping” (see
Biro & Leslie, 2007), is that the “agentive” events in the current study (Experiments 1
—”agentive,” 2, and 3) displayed cues that led infants to interpret the events as agentive and goal-directed, and as a result, infants preferred to look at motion events with
an agent moving to a clear endpoint (goal) over events without a clear endpoint (i.e.,
the starting point events). Further, following Gergely and Csibra (2003), infants may
have been interpreting the event in terms of the eﬃciency of the action in which the
endstate was achieved. If the action performed by the ﬁgure was eﬃcient, such as the
ﬁgure moving along a direct path to the endpoint, then the action was interpreted as
goal-directed and rational; the endpoint was represented as an integral part of the
event and more attention was allocated to processing it. In contrast, if the action performed by the ﬁgure was ineﬃcient, such as the ﬁgure moving in a circuitous path to
an endpoint, then the action was not interpreted as goal-directed or rational and further attention was not allocated to it. If the ﬁgure moved in a straight path out of the
nest (an eﬃcient action), then one prediction is that infants may represent the endstate
as getting away from the starting point and the one question for future research is if
getting away from the starting point was portrayed to be an overarching goal of the
event (e.g., a duck moves out of a nest because the nest is on ﬁre), would the visual
preference for an endpoint over a starting point diminish? asymmetry in looking may
very well disappear.
3

With respect to causality, note that in the nonagentive condition of Exp. 1, the events were constructed
such that the cause of motion of the ﬁgure (leaf/tissue) was obscured (see Method). In Exp. 3, the starting
point events were constructed such that the starting point clearly caused the motion of the ﬁgure. Thus, perhaps when the cause of motion is obscure, infants reason about what caused the motion of the ﬁgure and
allocate less attention to the endpoint and starting point in the events.
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Another possibility is that infants may have looked longer at the endpoint events in
experiments 1 (“agent”), 2, and 3 because they have learned to associate certain behavioral and/or morphological cues of the moving ﬁgure (e.g., self-propelled straight path
motion, face) with the outcome of the moving ﬁgure reaching an endpoint object,
whereas the association between the starting point and these cues is not as strong. Factors such as the distance between the ﬁgure and endpoint object decreasing as the
event unfolds (the duck approaches the endpoint object) may play a role in the diﬀering association strengths.4 Infants may have also made anticipatory, predictive looks
at the endpoint object given that the action was performed by an “agent” (see FalckYtter et al., 2006; Henrichs et al., 2014), and these anticipatory looks may have contributed to the increased attention to the endpoint events. Future research can test this
possibility by examining the precise looking patterns of infants over the course of the
event. Under what conditions do infants make predictive eye movements to the endpoint? Note that the learning scenario proposed by this explanation does not necessitate that infants interpreted the ﬁgure in the events as animate/agentive or interpreted
the event as intentional; rather, the proposal is that infants have learned from their
experiences to associate certain cues in the events with endpoints more than starting
points (see Rakison & Poulin-Dubois for an detailed discussion of this view, 2001).
Indeed, research has shown that infants are sensitive to statistical regularities in their
input in a variety of domains (e.g., Saﬀran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996), including representations of goal-directed actions by 12 months (Henrichs et al., 2014).
One interesting question for future research is whether a visual preference for endpoint events over starting point events may be related to infants’ own engagement in
certain types of goal-directed actions (e.g., Falck-Ytter et al., 2006 and see Rakison &
Woodward, 2008 for a review). The 16-month-old infants in the current study were
likely to be crawling and maybe walking; Are these locomotor abilities related to the
endpoint event preference that was observed? Future research could explore this by
testing whether younger infants, who are not yet crawling or walking, show a visual
preference for endpoints versus starting points and importantly for what types of
events (“agentive” versus “nonagentive”).
Mapping of infants’ event representations into language
The current ﬁnding that 16-month-olds show a visual preference for endpoint events
over starting points events contributes to existing literature reporting other perceptual
biases in infants, such as infants’ preferences for faces over nonfaces (e.g., Johnson
et al., 1991), biological over nonbiological motion (Simion et al., 2008), and infantdirected speech over adult-directed speech (e.g., Werker & McLeod, 1989). It has been
suggested that such biases play a role in learning because they drive attention to
important information in the environment (such as attention to word boundaries, in
the case of segmenting words in language learning, Thiessen, Hill, & Saﬀran, 2005).
We hypothesize that a visual preference for endpoint versus starting point events may
also support subsequent learning, speciﬁcally learning about the semantic and syntactic
argument structure of motion verbs in language. We consider this hypothesis in more
detail below.
4
We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing the idea of associative learning to bear on the observed
endpoint/starting point asymmetry.
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As discussed in the Introduction, by 16 months (the age of the infants in the current
study), infants comprehend, and sometimes even produce, language encoding spatial
paths and their endpoints (referred to as “goal paths” in language) and spatial paths
and their starting points (referred to as “source paths” in language; Bowerman, 1996;
Choi & Bowerman, 1991). In addition, much research has shown that there is a robust
asymmetry between goal and source paths, both in language structure and in language
use, and this asymmetry holds cross-linguistically (see Lakusta & Landau, 2012). In
syntactic structure, linguists propose that the endpoint is a direct argument of the verb,
whereas the starting point is an adjunct; in semantic structure, “goal paths” constitute
core events (result states), whereas “source paths” modify the process of the event (e.g.,
Filip, 2003; Markovskaya, 2006; Nam, 2004). This privileged role of endpoints in
semantic and syntactic structure is supported by studies reporting that when children
and adults are asked to describe events, they include the endpoint object and its path
more frequently in their descriptions than the starting point and its path, saying, for
example, “the bird ﬂew into the pot,” rather than, for example, “the bird ﬂew out of
the bowl” when viewing an event of a bird ﬂying out of a bowl into a pot (Lakusta &
Landau, 2005). Notably, this asymmetry in language also holds for motion events
involving a nonagentive ﬁgure (e.g., leaf blows from a coaster onto a tape; Lakusta &
Landau, 2012).
How can a visual preference for endpoints over starting points in infants support
learning the semantic and syntactic structure of goal and source paths in language, such
that goal paths get mapped into linguistic structure as arguments of motion verbs,
whereas source paths get mapped as adjuncts? Infants’ preferential attention to endpoints (as shown in the current study) and their bias to encode endpoints over starting
points (as shown by Lakusta et al., 2007; Lakusta & Carey, 2015) suggest that when
infants view motion events they may consider the endpoint but not the starting point as
an essential component of the event (i.e., as important information in the environment).
Then, when they are presented with the problem of ﬁguring out the reference of a
motion verb (e.g., “run,” in English), they may consider the endpoint, but not the starting point, an integral part of the verb’s meaning. Given that children are able to map
nonverbal representations into semantic and syntactic representations, and given that
they distinguish arguments from adjuncts, during language acquisition, they may represent the endpoint as an argument of the verb and represent the starting point as an
adjunct (modiﬁer). Furthermore, consistent with how language often represents events
at a courser level compared to perceptual representations of events (Landau & Jackendoﬀ, 1993), this semantic/syntactic structure may extend to all endpoints—endpoints in
both “agentive” and “nonagentive” events thus yielding the broad goal bias that has
been observed in language (see Lakusta & Carey, 2015, for a detailed explanation).
The challenge for future research is to directly test this hypothesized relationship
between infants’ preference for endpoints over starting points and their acquisition of
goal and source paths in language and further to determine the directionality of any
eﬀects. If a visual endpoint preference supports language, then infants should show
this preference prior to the age at which goal and source path language is acquired (as
has been shown for many other perceptual preferences in infancy). However, the presence of a visual endpoint bias at 16-month-olds, an age at which children are in the
midst of acquiring the semantic structures of motion verbs and their paths, presents
initial support for the hypothesized role of this preference in language learning and
paves the way for future research.
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In conclusion, using a looped video presentation methodology that measured how
long 16-month-old infants looked at events depicting a ﬁgure moving into an endpoint
object versus out of a starting point object, the current study revealed an endpoint/
starting point asymmetry; infants preferred the endpoint events. This preference held
even when the starting point object was made more physically salient than the endpoint object (i.e., when it was larger and more colorful as in Exp. 2) and when it
moved and caused motion of the ﬁgure (Exp. 3); however, the preference was not
observed when the events depicted a “nonagentive” ﬁgure that moved in a circuitous
path to/from the endpoint/starting point. It is hypothesized that such a preference may
have important implications for how children learn the language of goal and source
paths.
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